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a b s t r a c t
To decarbonise its electricity system, Europe must rapidly expand renewables. We analyse the contro-
versy between two organisations, Eurosolar and Desertec, which seemingly pursue the same goal of
100% renewable electricity. We show that they interpret “100% renewables” differently and envision
fundamentally different renewable electricity futures, to be reached through different governance path-
ways driven by different actors. Desertec reacts to mankind’s violation of the Earth’s carrying capacity
and seeks secure decarbonisation through renewables, for which centrally regulated, large-scale imports
of controllable concentrating solar power from the desert are necessary. Eurosolar, in contrast, seeks
to decentralise the electricity supply and disempower the actors who caused the unsustainable and
undemocratic energy system, for which renewables are suited as they are carbon-neutral and decen-
tralised by nature. As the core aim of Desertec, controllable solar power imports through large-scale
infrastructure, violates Eurosolar’s core aim of decentralisation, a compromise is difﬁcult: this would
require one organisation to give up its primary objective. Our results show that the reason for this con-
troversy among renewables proponents lies not in technology or cost, and can thus not be identiﬁed or
resolved through techno-economic analysis or modelling, but in irreconcilable differences in normative
aims and governance choices.. Introduction
To reach the long-term climate targets, the European electric-
ty sector must be completely decarbonised by mid-century [1–4].
n the supply side, different combinations of nuclear power, fossil
ower with CCS, and renewables can achieve this [5] and there are
ntensepolitical debateswhichof these is thebest. Perhaps the least
urprising debate is between proponents of conventional electric-
ty technologies – nuclear power or fossil fuels (with/without CCS)
and renewables: creating anew, renewable electricity systemwill
rigger resistance from those with interests in the old system, and
here are strong ideological differences between a nuclear- and a
enewables-based future. In some countries, notably Germany, the
uclear issue is among the most heated political conﬂicts of all and
historical starting point for the political environmentalist move-
ents, and the nuclear-renewables conﬂict is still a main driver of
he energy debate [6].
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: johan.lilliestam@usys.ethz.ch (J. Lilliestam).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.03.011
214-6296/© 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.Visions are emotionally appealing descriptions of the problem
to solve, the desired future system and the policies and gover-
nance pathways to achieve that future [7–9]. Hence, visions for
nuclear/fossil energy or renewables may be very different, and, as
we show in this article, also renewables visions may differ greatly.
In order to remain “objective”, however, mainstream energy sys-
tem modellers are careful to “distinguish their ‘visions’ from their
calculations” [10] and consider techno-economic features in detail
while ignoring, explicitly or implicitly, most governance choices
and normative aspects of the energy system [11]. Modern energy
scenarios describe how broader societal or political developments
affect the energy future [12,13] (e.g. regional rivalry or more global
cooperation [14]). The policy recommendations are however often
“presented in singular prescriptive ways”, and policy-makers often
refer to techno-economic energy studies for “proof” that their pro-
posal is, in fact, the best [15].
Yet, renewables differ from conventional power in more
respects than their carbon-neutrality. Importantly, they are mod-
ular and can be built as rooftop PV arrays or single wind turbines,
or in gigawatt-sized farms. Hence, both small, including individual
citizens, and large investors such as major energy companies can
build and own renewable power stations, with far-reaching differ-
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onces both in impacts (e.g. cost, whether value-creation is localised
r remote) and in the governance pathways (e.g. feed-in tariffs
nabling small-scale investors, or quota schemes with higher risk
avouring large companies) [4,11]. The technical characteristics of
enewables add a societal dimension, suggesting that renewables
ay not be simply technologies but that they may also entail a soci-
tal, normative – and hence potentially conﬂict-laden – choice of
hich type of renewable electricity future is most desirable [16].
One controversy among renewables proponents has been ongo-
ng since the early 2000s between the organisations Desertec
oundation and Eurosolar. This is intriguing, as the two organ-
sations appear to have the same aim. Eurosolar is dedicated to
completely substituting fossil and nuclear energy through renew-
ble energy”, which they view as “the challenge of the century
o humanity” [17], and Desertec propagates the replacement of
uclear and fossil power with renewables to avoid risks “of nuclear
roliferation andof climate change” [18],which “confrontmankind
ith unprecedented challenges” [19].
Still, Eurosolar is among the harshest critics of Desertec, which
t perceives as “amirage”i [20], “a step backwards to the conceptual
lutter of the early 20th century”ii [21], and a “pseudo-progressive
and] tedious detour”iii [22]. Rather than a vision for a renewable
uture,Desertec is “apoliticalweaponagainst the expansionof local
nd regional solar and wind power”iv [22]. Desertec, in contrast,
ees Eurosolar’s strategy as “questionable in terms of ethics and
ustainability [as it] propagates aEuropeunaffectedby theeventual
uture misery of its neighbours, and fosters the illusion of indepen-
ency on a rather small and crowded planet”; further, Eurosolar’s
ne-sided focus on local and small-scale renewables makes the
ransition insecure and slow [23]. Instead of rejecting Eurosolar’s
ision altogether, however, Desertec states that “decentralized and
nternationally linked renewable energy resources optimally com-
lement each other”: given the urgency of the climate and energy
rises, we need both [24].
Here, we investigate this apparent paradox and identify the rea-
onswhyEurosolar andDesertecdisagree so stronglyalthough they
eemingly want the same thing. We seek the reason of the con-
roversy, despite the apparent agreement on 100% renewables, in
ifferences in their visions: what do these organisations want, and
ow are their visions different? Ultimately, the question arises: are
he two visions mutually exclusive, because their core aims clash,
r is a compromise possible? We hypothesise that they, behind
he headline rhetoric, strive to achieve fundamentally different and
ncompatible renewable energy futures, through largely diverging
overnance approaches: we expect that this energy controversy is
ot primarily about the power mixes, the pie-charts or the costs of
he different futures, but about the softer issues such as how the
nvisioned system and the transition are governed, which prob-
em each vision aims to solve, and who carries out the transition.
n short: we expect that the controversy we investigate is rooted
n fundamental differences in the visions. By empirically exploring
he visions of two organisations in the German renewables policy
rena, we seek to convey to scientiﬁc electricity system modelling
nd the energypolicy debate that there is a “plurality of social inter-
retations of energy alternatives, each equally valid under different
easonable perspectives” [15].
Below, we review the literature and reﬂect on how visions may
e classiﬁed in a number of different but similar theoretical predic-
ions of vision type taxonomies (Section 2). Inspired by discourse
nalysis, our method is centred on the concept of storylines, which
llow us to efﬁciently summarise the main arguments of the two
isions (Section 3). We describe the organisations and their politi-
al impact (Sections 4.1 and 4.3), and identify (Sections 4.2 and 4.4)
nd compare (Section 4.5) their storylines. In Section 5, we discuss
ur ﬁndings and present conclusions.2. Background
The mainstream energy system and energy policy research
focuses on the technical and economic aspects of renewable energy
scenarios [25–29]. Over the last decade, numerous studies have
shown that high – up to 100% – shares of renewables are techni-
cally feasible and economically attractive in many countries and
regions, including Australia [30], Denmark [31], Germany [32], the
US [33], Europe [3,34], Europe and MENA (Middle East and North
Africa) [35], and even globally [36]. Such techno-economic studies
however tend to ignore or “mask the human elements of energy”
[26], which calls for “the tool-box of social sciences” to be used to
support and improve techno-economic system modelling [11].
Indeed, several social-scientiﬁc authors criticise the “disap-
pointing” [37] scope of mainstream energy science, because
“conﬂicts in the domain of energy and climate are not primarily
due to lack of scientiﬁc facts or objective truth. Instead, they are
more due to a clash of priorities, interests, and normative assump-
tions which create a number of subjective truths” [38]. Although
visions are key drivers of the energy policy debate, they are largely
ignored by the mainstream literature [7–9]. An energy vision does
not address all problems in theworldbutmerely a subset, reﬂecting
the subjective perception and prioritisation of problems. As dif-
ferent persons value problems differently, the subset of problems
to solve differs between visions, and the visions themselves can –
although they address the samephysical reality – be fundamentally
different. Hence, there is not one single techno-economic truth, but
multiple socially constructed truths with different but valid end-
state aims and governance pathways [9,38] (see below). This is a
key source of conﬂict, since “people are unlikely to support a policy
that is aimed at solving what they do not see to be the problem”
[39].
Authors have gone about classiﬁcation of visions for electricity
decarbonisation in different ways. Battaglini et al. [40], for exam-
ple, identify two main options for 100% renewables in Europe:
bottom-up, decentralised Smartgrid solutions focusing on small-
scale generation, and top-down, centralised Supergrid approaches,
focusing on very large transmission systems and large-scale gen-
eration. Yet, they argue that Europe has no time to quarrel about
which type of renewables it wants, so that “the two concepts [. . .]
can and must co-exist in order to guarantee a transition to a decar-
bonised economy” [40]: the two visions can and must be merged
into a SuperSmart Grid vision. This is exactly the same statement as
Desertec’s reply to Eurosolar’s criticism (see Section 1).
Others adopt the position that a transformation of the energy
system is not mainly about energy as such, but about governance
of the energy system [41–43]. Lovins, for example, distinguishes
between Hard and Soft energy paths and characterises the essence
of energy politics as a choice between these [44,45]. The Hard path
focuses onways to supplymore energy to satisfy a growingdemand
in a centralised system based on technological progress. The cen-
tralised Hard path remains dominant, both in European energy
policy [1] and in system modelling [11]. The Soft path, in contrast,
emphasises demand-constraint combined with decentralisation of
energy governance and puts energy generation directly under citi-
zen ownership or control. These Paths are notmainly distinguished
“by choices of hardware” but “by the socio-political structure of the
energy system”; hence, they are technically compatible but “mutu-
ally exclusive” because of diverging governance requirements and
aims [44].
In the Realising Transitions Pathways project [46,47], Foxon
and colleagues deﬁne qualitative decarbonisation visions for the
UK and then quantify these into vision-driven “transition path-
ways”. Instead of using the standard approach of modelling a
cost-optimal decarbonised technical electricity system without
asking about governance choices and system structure, they place
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sormative end-state aims and governance pathways as the start-
ng point and build quantitative scenarios from that. Based on
he Multi-level Perspective on Sociotechnical Transitions (MLP)
48,49], this project suggests that there are three competing Logics
n UK low-carbon energy policy and energy research – the Market,
overnment and Civil Society Logics – each with a distinct dom-
nant actor, governance path and end-state decarbonisation aim
46,47]. In the Market logic, energy ﬁrms are the dominant actors,
hereas policy-makers should “set the framework and get out”.
his leaves the market as the principal coordination mechanism
or decarbonisation, leading to large generation assets and a strong
ransmission system. In the Government Logic, the government
irectly manages the transition to a decarbonised future, through
government agency issuing contracts for tranches of low-carbon
upply, leading to a similar infrastructure system as in the Market
ogic. In the Civil Society Logic, the government enables the transi-
ion through a feed-in tariff and the transition happens through a
ultitudeofbottom-up, local communityapproachesdrivenbycit-
zens, local entrepreneurs and social movements, leading to more
ecentralised supply and a stronger focus on distribution than
ransmission. The choice ofwhich logic is the best and should dom-
nate national energy policy is “inherently political” and cannot be
odelled but must follow from a “debate on what kind of energy
uture we, as a society, would like to see” [47].
The three competing Logics are similar, but not identical, to the
ssertions made by Cultural Theory [50] (CT; see Ref. [51] for a dis-
ussion of how MLP and CT ﬁt together). Rooted in anthropology,
T claims that in every policy debate, there are four fundamental,
utually exclusive forms of Rationalities, each based on axioms
egarding human nature and interactions that explain how peo-
le perceive the world. These Rationalities are determined by two
ocial dimensions (see Fig. 1): the grid refers to the degree to
hich rules and outside authority determine individual behaviour,
hereas the group refers to the degree to which the commitment
o a group affects individual thought and action [52].
Loose grid and weak group cohesion determine an Indi-
idualistic Rationality. Individualists stand for high individual
esponsibility, independence and trust in the market and its efﬁ-
iency for solving problems. Translated to the context of our
tudy, individualists let all (renewable) technologies compete on
free market, letting the most competitive ones prevail, similar to
oxon’s Market Logic. Featuring high grid and strong group cohe-
ion is Hierarchism.Hierarchists prefer state control and regulation
nd turn to experts for guidance on problems and crises. Hierarchic
lectricity solutions are top-down, relying on large-scale solutions
ightly controlled by policy; this is similar to Foxon’s Government
ogic. Egalitarianism is characterisedby loosegrid and stronggroup
ohesion, so that egalitariansprefer communal, non-discriminating
olutions. For the electricity sector, egalitarians seek communally
wned, small-scale solutions matching local and regional capac-
ty and needs, similarly to Foxon’s Civil Society logic. Finally, dense
rid butweak group cohesion qualiﬁes as Fatalism,which is usually
bsent from policy debates. According to CT, working real world
ormations are rarely or never elegant – i.e. policies presented as
ithout alternative, fully achieving the aims of only one Rational-
ty – but are inevitably clumsy solutions that do not fulﬁl all wishes
f any Rationality completely, but are a compromise between the
hree Rationalities and acceptable, or non-objectable, to all.
This theoretical literature suggests that there are fundamentally
ifferent renewable electricity visions and that diverging visions
re a key reason for controversy. In the following sections, we
mpirically investigate the visions of Desertec and Eurosolar as
xpressed in their respective storylines to seewhether and inwhich
espects the visions differ, and whether a compromise seems pos-
ible or if their core aims clash, making them mutually exclusive.3. Method
In order to answer our research questions and ﬁnd out what the
controversy between Eurosolar and Desertec is about and whether
a compromise is possible, we must understand what these organi-
sations see as theproblem,what solution they aim for andhowthey
want to achieve it, and whether there are fundamental differences
in their aims or tools. Here, we do this by identifying and analysing
their storylines, using key elements of discourse analysis.
A discourse is “a shared way of apprehending the world”
[54], providing its adherents with concepts, categorisations and
convictions about a particular phenomenon, giving meaning and
legitimacy to associated knowledge [55]. Discourses shape what
can and cannot be said and delimit both the problem framing and
the range of policy options, and therefore serve as precursors to
policy outcomes [56,57]. A discourse is manifested in storylines,
metaphors and discourse coalitions, it is communicated through
text and speech (e.g. books, reports, conferences) and can be iden-
tiﬁed by analysis of the same [55–58].
Storylines are “condensed statements summarizing complex
narratives” that are “used as ‘short hand”’ in debates [58]. In this
paper, we examine the storylines of the two organisations, as these
provide brief and comprehensible summaries of their visions. Sto-
rylines, just like all stories, have “a beginning, a middle and an end”
and they have speciﬁc elements, such as heroes, villains, a problem
to solve, a complication or a twist, and amoral [58–60] (see below).
Metaphors highlight and illustrate key concepts of a discourse and
themerementioning of ametaphormay call intomind awhole nar-
rative; the metaphor “climate change”, for example, may re-invoke
thenarrative of a heating climate causedbyhumanswithout neces-
sitating re-telling all scientiﬁc arguments [61]. Discourse coalitions
are groups of actors subscribing to certain storylines and using
them in an identiﬁable set of practices [55].
In our analysis, we focus on the storylines to reveal the different
interpretations of the common metaphor “100% renewables”. As
neither organisation can be said to represent a whole discourse
coalition, althoughwebelieve that both are indeeddominant actors
in their respective coalitions (see the policy impact descriptions
in Sections 4.1 and 4.3), and as this is irrelevant to our research
questions, we do not further use the discourse coalition concept:
the storylines identiﬁed and analysed here are those of these two
organisations only. We equally do not discuss which organisation
is the most powerful or whether one story has achieved discursive
hegemony:we focus only on identifying and comparing the visions
of Desertec and Eurosolar as expressed in their storylines.
In order to reproducibly trace the storylines, we examine the
main written outlets of the two groups. In this, we focus on publi-
cations from the last decade, and especially from 2008 onwards,
capturing the time when both organisations were visible in the
political debate (see organisation descriptions in Sections 4.1 and
4.3). We describe the Desertec storyline as expressed in the publi-
cations of TREC/Desertec Foundation, as well as by individuals and
organisations belonging to the Desertec network. This includes all
major publications of Desertec, including the widely distributed
White book [18] and Red paper [19].We describe the Eurosolar sto-
ryline as depicted in the books of Hermann Scheer, the founder and
key thinker of Eurosolar, and all articles in its journal Solarzeitalter
from 2005 onwards [62]. We use both English and German texts,
and translate all German quotes ourselves.
We identify the storylines of Desertec and Eurosolar through
analysis of the key storyline elements, both by means of element-
by-element comparison and through the lenses of the theoretical
taxonomies described in Section 2. We structure the storylines as
inspired by Verweij et al. [59] and Fløttum and Gjerstad [60] (see
also above) by the storyline elements, describing the heroes, i.e. the
key actors carrying out the solution outlined in the storyline; the
Fig. 1. The rationalities of cultural th
Table 1
Summary of the storyline elements.
What it means
The heroes The actors solving the problem
The problem The problem to be solved
The villain The ones who caused the problem
The solution How to solve the problem
The beneﬁts The good things that come when the
end-state aim has been achieved
The transition The actions and policies necessary to
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In the Desertec storyline, the central protagonists are nationalimplement the solution
The barriers The unexpected complicating twist
roblemtobesolvedand thevillainwho isperceived tohavecaused
he problem; as well as the moral – the solution and its beneﬁts –
f the storyline, including the barriers in the way of achieving the
esired end-state aim (see Table 1).
. Results
.1. The organisation Desertec Foundation
The root of what is today the Desertec Foundation was the
rans-MediterraneanRenewableEnergyCooperation (TREC),much
entred around the German physicist Gerhard Knies, with the Club
f Rome as the main backing organisation [18]. The Desertec/TREC
ision was translated into the Desertec concept (Med-CSP and
rans-CSP studies), foreseeing point-to-point imports of con-
rollable concentrated solar power (CSP) via highly efﬁcient
igh-voltage direct-current (HVDC) lines from MENA to Europe,
y a team of researchers at the German Aerospace Centre (DLR)
23,63] (see Section 4.2.3 for details on why CSP is controllable).
he Desertec Foundation – founded in 2009 – “is committed to the
orldwide implementation of the DESERTEC concept: a solution
n the ﬁght for a sustainable global energy policy and thus also
or security, peace and social stability” [64]. The foundation cap-
tal was donated by a number of individuals, of which many are
till active in the Foundation, and the Club of Rome; the fundingeory. Adapted from Ref. [53].
comes from donations from private persons, industry and other
foundations [65].
TheDii (formerly theDesertec Industrial Initiative)was founded
in 2009 by the Munich Re insurance company, and consisted of 11
large,mainlyGerman companies and theDesertec Foundation [66].
It immediately received broad support for the idea, including from
the German federal government [67]. Whereas Dii was founded to
push the Desertec concept, the industrial consortium quickly devi-
ated from the “original concept”, for which the controllability of
CSP and point-to-point HVDC lines are key, and instead searched
for cost-optimal renewable electricity expansion paths with large
imports of wind and PV power to Europe from MENA via a vast
interconnectedHVAC grid [68]. The split between the twoDesertec
organisations became evident when the Desertec Foundation left
the Dii consortium in 2013, taking the Desertec brand name with
it, because of irresolvable conﬂicts regarding “strategies, obliga-
tions and [. . .] the managerial style of Dii’s top management” [69],
triggered by the Dii CEO’s interview statements that solar power
imports to Europe are unfeasible [70]. Today, Dii still exists but is
hardly present in the public debate.
The work and ideas of TREC/Desertec Foundation were inﬂu-
ential in the creation of the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP),
foreseeing the construction of 20 GW renewable power in the
southern/eastern Mediterranean basin, under the umbrella of
the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008; the Desertec Founda-
tion/TREC iswidely seen as “the father of the Solar Plan” [66,71–73].
Desertec is present in the EuropeanCommission’s long-termdecar-
bonisation strategy, which seeks ways to “harness the solar energy
potential of the Sahara” and to develop “pan-European electricity
highways” to integrate remote renewables [1].
4.2. The Desertec storyline
4.2.1. The heroesand European policy-makers. These must introduce an “adequate
policy and economic framework” to enable the construction of
CSP stations in MENA and large-scale imports of controllable solar
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[ower to Europe, for example in an EU-MENA electricity treaty or
y including imported CSP in national support schemes [19,23,74].
ther key actors in the Desertec storyline are scientists and energy
xperts, especially the team at DLR that developed the “original
oncept” of controllable CSP imports through point-to-point HVDC
ines to Europe [19,24,68,75]. As long as the transition is secure
nd rapidly brings humanity under the carrying capacity, it is not
mportantwho builds and operates the newelectricity system [18].
owever, an expansion carried out only by citizens and small-scale
nvestors “cannot attain the sustainable supply required to meet
he energy needs of fast-growing cities”: to gain sufﬁcient speed
large corporations canplayauseful role” [24]. A centralised system
tructure with large generators and transmission lines is beneﬁ-
ial, because “the power production costs of energy providers are
igniﬁcantly lower than that of private production” [24].
.2.2. The problem and the villain
At the beginning of the Desertec storyline stands mankind
s the villain, and an intertwined complex of a growing world
opulation and its dependence on ﬁnite resources, in particu-
ar water, fossil and nuclear fuels. The resulting violation of the
arth’s carrying capacity is a threat to prosperity and, ultimately,
o the survival of mankind. The strain on the water resources is
lready now hindering the economic and social development of
oor countries, especially those with deserts, and this problem will
ncrease with climate change, reinforcing the already grave and
mmoral inequalities between North and South. This “incompati-
ility between world population and earth’s carrying capacity will
ead tomajor disasters”, or even the “collapseof civilization”, unless
e develop and implement a plan to solve the problem ([76], also
efs. [19,63,77]).
All continents have sufﬁcient resources for complete power
ystem decarbonisation with the only non-ﬁnite energy resource
vailable—renewables. In Europe, however, the feasible renewable
otential is near the current electricity demand, so that Europemay
ncounter resource constraints in the future. Even more impor-
antly, “60% of this potential comes from [. . .] ﬂuctuating resources
hat can provide electricity, but almost no ﬁrm power capacity on
emand” [23]. Solving thisﬂuctuationproblemdomesticallywithin
urope would require storage and other expensive technical solu-
ions, thus causing a cost problem which could make the transition
o renewables infeasible [78].
.2.3. The solution and the beneﬁts
The Desertec concept is a plan for mankind to live within the
imits of the Earth’s carrying capacity as quickly as possiblewithout
hreatening energy security. To achieve this, “there is no alternative
o a rapid expansion of renewable energies, including electricity
mports from deserts”v [79]. The Desertec concept combines the
reatest assets of MENA – deserts – and Europe – technology – in
rder to “combat climate change, ensure a reliable energy supply
nd promote security and development by generating sustainable
ower from the sites where renewable sources of energy are most
bundant” [80].
The Desertec concept foresees large-scale expansion of domes-
ic renewables and the import of controllable CSP electricity from
he Sahara and Arab deserts to Europe. The main beneﬁt of CSP
ver other renewables such as photovoltaic or wind power is that
t can be equipped with heat storages and draw on these to gener-
te power when there is no sun, so that CSP is not ﬂuctuating but
an be regulated to ﬁt demand. Therefore, CSP adds a controllable
enewable electricity source, something that Europe sorely needs
o balance its domestic, ﬂuctuating generation [24]. Desertec is a
ision that “simultaneously tackles efﬁciently all the global chal-
enges [and] offers new options for prosperity and development”
19], so that “clean power from deserts is not the only availablesource of clean energy, but it is practically the only one which is
available without source limitations and simultaneously at eco-
nomically viable conditions” [76].
Desertec thus provides the answer to the resource, cost and
variability problems accompanying all other European renewables
solutions. It solves the resource problem, as “within 6h deserts
receive more energy from the sun than mankind consumes within
a year” [19]. Building CSP stations on 0.3% of the world’s deserts
– land that is practically empty – would sufﬁce to produce the
current world electricity demand. As 90% of the world population
live within 3000km from a desert and can be efﬁciently supplied
with desert power viaHVDC, Desertec is a blueprint for sustainable,
secure and cost-efﬁcient electricity not only for Europe and MENA,
but for the whole world [19].
The cost of renewables depends largely on the resource qual-
ity, and hence a low-cost renewable future requires generation
only “in regions of best performance and abundance, distributed all
over Europe and MENA” [23]. Because of the better solar resource,
Desertec argues, it is cheaper to build a CSP plant in Morocco and
transport the electricity to Spain via HVDC than to build the plant
directly in Spain [74].
There are fourmain beneﬁts forMENA. First, Desertecwillmake
cheap renewable electricity capacities available for the growing
MENA economies. The core principle of Desertec is to ﬁrst ensure
that the MENA electricity demand is satisﬁed and then to export to
Europe. This will also reduce the need for energy subsidies, which
are today a serious drain on many MENA state budgets [18,63].
Second, the exporting state can use the CSP export revenues to
ﬁnance infrastructure, education, to expand domestic electricity
generation or import food to overcome its water crisis [23,75].
Third, expanding solar power in the desert will attract investment
and create qualiﬁed jobs in the MENA region. This will ensure that
the wealth generated by the exports reaches the people, and not
only the elites, and help to build an educated middle class. These
points together ensure thatDesertecwill “create jobs andeconomic
wealth and hence constitute prosperity” in MENA [24,75]. This will
make Desertec attractive to the exporters, but also to Europe: as it
leads to “the creation of education and employment opportunities
as well as better general living conditions, Desertec is an ideal anti-
terror program” [24]. Fourth, the “huge solar energy potentials of
MENA can easily produce the energy necessary to avoid the threat-
ening freshwater deﬁcit” [81]: thewaste heat from the CSP stations
can be used for large-scale seawater desalination.
In this sense, Desertec can be “the starting point for EUMENA
as a region of cooperation, peace and prosperity, much as the coal
and steel community was the origin of a cooperating, peaceful and
prosperous Europe” [18].When implemented, Desertecwill lead to
“prosperity for all peoples involved” [82].
4.2.4. The transition and the barriers
The technologies needed – CSP and HVDC – are available today
and “have been in use for decades” [75]. The transition from coal
and nuclear power to an inter-continental renewable power sys-
tem is therefore only a political problem: “all that is needed now is
the political will and the right framework of incentives” [75]. If the
political will is present, “it would be possible to achieve a world-
wide realisation of the Desertec concept in less than 30 years” [19],
by launching “an Apollo-like ‘EUMENA-Desertec’ program” [77].
Initial state-support, like “feed-in tariffs and investmentguarantees
are needed to get things moving” [75], but “no long-term subsidies
like for fossil or nuclear energies” [63] as renewables experience
strong learning effects and are already cheaper than conventional
power, if conventional generators paid their external costs. This
initial support, summing up to 10 billion D for all European coun-
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wries together, should therefore “be considered a public investment
ather than a subsidy” ([23], also Ref. [18]).
.3. The organisation Eurosolar
Eurosolar – the European Association for Renewable Energy –
as founded in 1988 on initiative of the German politician Her-
ann Scheer. It is a European organisation, but theGerman section,
hich is by far the largest, is dominant. The Eurosolar vision is
ased on ideas expressed in Scheer’s writings, which remain inﬂu-
ntial also after his death in 2010. Eurosolar is committed to
completely replacing nuclear and fossil energy with renewables
which is] the central precondition for the preservation of nature
nd a sustainable economic strategy”vi [83]. Its roots lie in the
nti-nuclear powermovement of the 1970s and 1980s, and Euroso-
ar ideas draw strongly on the subsidiary principles expressed in
genda21 [22,84–87]. Eurosolar is a not-for-proﬁt organisation
unded mainly by membership fees and revenues from events and
ublications;by farmostmembers are individuals anda small share
re juridical persons [17].
The political impact of Eurosolar can be seen in particular in
he German feed-in law, drafted and propagated by, among oth-
rs, Scheer [4,88]. Especially the early versions of the law holds
ost parts of the Eurosolar storyline and justify the law by local
alue and job creation, introducing the aim of the law as one to
ot only increase the share of renewables but to ensure “that espe-
ially decentralised smaller installations become the pillar of the
uture energy supply”vii [89] (see Section 4.4.4). Further, Eurosolar
as highly inﬂuential in the creation of the International Renew-
ble Energy Agency (IRENA), which became operational in 2010
90,91]; because of his instrumental role, Scheer is acknowledged
s “the father of IRENA” [92].
.4. The Eurosolar storyline
.4.1. The heroes
Following the Agenda21 maxim “think globally, act locally”, the
entral protagonists in the Eurosolar story are citizens – either as
ndividuals or partners in an energy cooperative – municipalities
nd public utilities [85]. Citizens are key the actors, both push-
ng for change locally and implementing the transition themselves
22,85,93]. Municipalities are key enablers, both by appointing
riority areas for renewables in the zoning policy, thus enabling
itizens to build renewable generators, and by expanding gener-
tion and consumption of renewables themselves (or through a
unicipal utility) [87,94]. It is equally important that the energy
ajors – the “structural enemies”viii of renewables – are not part of
he renewable energy future, as they have caused the very problem
urosolar seeks to solve and have much to gain from stopping the
ransition [22].
.4.2. The problem and the villain
At the heart of the Eurosolar storyline is the villain: the fossil-
uclear complex – the traditional major energy companies and
ts cronies in policy – and the centralised electricity system it
as created. The fossil-nuclear complex has created four interre-
ated crises threatening society and the people in it: dependence
n ever-scarcer fossil energy resources and the concentration of
emaining resources in unstable regions; dependence on increas-
ngly costly and peace-threatening energy imports; “unsolved and
nsolvable”ix nuclear risks; and climate change and environmen-
al degradation ([22], also Refs. [84,94–96]). Continuing within the
entralised energy paradigm threatens to “plunge civilization into
n all-enveloping crisis [. . .] trigger misery and migration for hun-
reds of millions of people [while] conﬂicts, including resource
ars, over access to the last energy resources loom”x [22]; onthe horizon are the “return to barter trade [. . .] mass unemploy-
ment, state bankruptcies [. . .] and ultimately famine”xi [96]. Hence,
replacing the fossil-nuclear energy system – “the largest economic
and social problem of the 21st century”xii [97] – with a decen-
tralised, fully renewable one is imperative.
However, as the survival of the fossil-nuclear complex is
threatened, it will try to stop the transition to renewables
“before the beneﬁts become visible to all and renewables become
unstoppable”xiii [98]. As the fossil-nuclear complex is “the largest
and politically most inﬂuential sector in the world economy [it is]
naïve to think that this is frictionless and possible to realise in con-
sensus with the incumbents of traditional energy supply”xiv [84].
Defeating the fossil-nuclear complex is thus the key task of the
energy transition: decentralisation is a precondition for decarbon-
isation.
4.4.3. The solution and the beneﬁts
The solution to theseproblems is energyautonomy,whichmeans
not only local or regional energy autarky, but “self-determined
energy—free and independent of external pressures, coercion and
interventions”xv [84]. The future energy supply must be “efﬁcient,
decentralised and regenerative”xvi [94], and “self-sufﬁciency in
energy, through renewable energy systems, is the only acceptable
perspective for the future”xvii [62].
Importantly, energy autonomy is not only about technologi-
cal change, but about a change in actors: it is necessary that “not
only the relationship between renewable and fossil-nuclear elec-
tricity changes, but also the structure of energy producers”xviii [99].
Reducing the discussion to one about power mixes and costs is a
“systemicmisunderstanding”, originating in the “market autism”xix
of the current energy system and policy-thinking [22].
The potential for renewables in Germany, Europe and the world
are sufﬁcient for 100% renewable energy [84]. Indeed, for supplying
all of Germany’s electricity needswith PV andonshorewindpower,
“only 2–3% of the country need to be made available”xx [97]; “no
less than half of the problem”xxi would be solved by replacing all
red roof tiles with the blue glow of solar panels [84]. Contrary to
what the fossil-nuclear complex makes people believe, decentral
renewables are not expensive but rather “the solution to the cost
problem”xxii [97]: “the primary energy is free and available in the
long run” and the costs for renewable generators are decreasing
rapidly, so that renewables are cheaper than “conventional ener-
gies with their increasing fuel costs”xxiii [22], especially if external
costs are accounted for.
The ﬂuctuations of wind and solar power, which critics erro-
neously believewill stop the transition soon, can be handled locally
or regionally with decentral storages and by combining ﬂuctuat-
ing and dispatchable renewable generators into virtual renewable
power plants. For this, however, the current energy paradigm must
be overcome and the power systemoperations adapted to the tech-
nical features of renewables, instead of renewables being adapted
to the needs of fossil-nuclear power [22,97].
The short distance from generation to consumption is “the
systemic advantage of renewable energies”xxiv [84,100], avoiding
“the complex technical, organisational, administrative and politi-
cal, all the way to military, expenses needed for the long way from
extraction to end-use of nuclear and fossil energies”xxv [84,101].
Furthermore, and unlike the fossil-nuclear energy system, the local
value and job creation is substantive: 380,000 persons worked in
theGerman renewable energybusiness in2012 [85,94,97]. A locally
autarkic renewable energy supply, ﬁnally, eliminates the need for
costly and risky energy imports, which improves energy security
and the trade balance; in 2012, “the trade balance deﬁcit of the
EU27 states was about 100 billion D , and the import bills for fos-
sil fuels were over 400 billion D ”xxvi [96]. Europe does not need
Table 2
Summary of the Desertec and Eurosolar storylines.
Desertec Eurosolar
The heroes - Experts (engineers, scientists)
- Energy companies
- National, European policy
- Citizens/citizen initiatives
- Municipal utilities
- Municipalities / regional policy
The villain - Mankind - The fossil-nuclear complex
The problem - Mankind’s hunger for resources violate the Earth’s carrying
capacity
- Renewables in Europe are ﬂuctuating; domestic grid integration
measures are expensive
- Increasing fossil fuel costs
- Fossil fuels running out, dependence increasingly risky and
peace-threatening
- Climate change and environmental degradation
- Nuclear risks
The solution Desertec concept:
- Masterplan for renewables, including solar power imports from
deserts to Europe, to achieve sustainability quickly while
maintaining energy security
Energy autonomy:
- Rapid decentralisation of electricity system with renewables
- Local autonomous initiatives, individual citizens/groups,
municipal utilities expand renewables
The beneﬁts - Abundant sustainable electricity
- Low-cost secure electricity
- Europe-MENA integration
- Improved socio-economic development in MENA
- Democratisation of energy
- Independence
- Abundant, cheap, environmentally friendly electricity
The transition - Starts as soon as there is political will
- Initial subsidies and policies for imported renewable electricity
- Is already happening
- Grass root initiatives supported by feed-in tariffs
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more oil sheikhs in the desert, but value creation, taxes and jobs
t home”xxvii [21,22].
.4.4. The transition and the barriers
The transition to a sustainable energy future can only emerge
rom autonomous renewables initiatives in municipalities and
ocieties: it cannot be managed top-down, although policy must
upport with an appropriate framework. After all, “a technological
evolution does not happen through technology itself, but through
he people who seize the new opportunities“xxviii [22].
Such a framework already exists in Germany: the Renewable
nergies Act (EEG—Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz), which is “the
ost successful concept for the implementation of the energy
ransition in the world“xxix ([97], also [21,22,86,100]). This law
egulates the priority feed-in for renewables and determines a
uaranteed price at different levels for different renewable tech-
ologies. The EEG seeks to leverage investments from multiple
ctors, to support local value creation and a new national renew-
bles industry, and make renewables – especially decentralised
enewables – the carrying pillar of the future electricity system
see Section 4.3) [89,102,103]. It has enabled hundreds of citi-
ens’ initiatives and thousands of single citizens to build renewable
ower stations, decentrally and without policy or industry telling
hem what to do: 30% of German electricity is already renewable.
ore than half of this is owned by citizens/initiatives and farmers,
hereas themajor energycompaniesownonly6.5% [85]. Especially
he modular structure of decentralised renewables is an accelerat-
ng factor, as it allows a multitude of actors – from single citizens
o municipal utilities – to pursue their own transition [22,85,104].
ence, the decentralised energy transition is more than a vision: it
s already happening.
Although several villages and municipalities have achieved
00% renewable energy or electricity supply [99,105], Germany
s a country has not, and neither has the EU. For the continua-
ion of the energy transition, re-nationalisation ormunicipalisation
f electricity grids is important, to allow “democratic control”xxx
f the physical marketplace for electricity and to stop the energy
ajors from continuously abusing of their power over the electric-- Resistance and power of fossil-nuclear complex
ity grid [22]. Further, politicians must continue the successful path
of the EEG without listening to the fear mongering of the fossil-
nuclear lobby. In the end, public costs arising from the EEG and the
continued expansion of decentralised renewables “would not be a
subsidy, but rather a premium for avoiding societal harm”xxxi [22].
4.5. Storyline comparison
At ﬁrst sight the two storylines have much in common, such
as the view of renewables as the only solution to dwindling fos-
sil energy resources, their rejection of nuclear power, the urge to
combat climate change, and the recognition that the sun shines for
free. The perceptions of the consequences of failing to transform
the electricity system – social, political and economic turmoil – are
similarly dramatic. In both storylines, renewables would be com-
petitive already today if nuclear and fossil power would pay for
their external costs.
Yet, although the addressed environmental problems are sim-
ilar, the heroes, villains, and the problems to solve are different,
leading to fundamentally diverging transition strategies and end-
state aims (see Table 2).
The heroes of Desertec are energy experts, energy companies
and national or European policy-makers. These actors are at the
top of the hierarchical system and Desertec looks to them to guide
Europe (and eventually mankind) to sustainability through active
policy and regulation based on scientiﬁc facts. To Desertec, this
is necessary, as mankind is not capable of saving itself. Eurosolar,
in contrast, sees most Desertec heroes as villains (see below) and
instead views citizens, grass-root initiatives, local policy-makers
and utilities as its heroes. These actors will bring about the needed
transition through amultitude of local initiatives. To Eurosolar, this
is necessary, as we can achieve the transition and reach energy
autonomy only through decentralisation and democratisation −
everybody must be accountable and a part of the change.ToDesertec, the villain ismankind and the problem is its hunger
for resources and the resulting violation of the Earth’s carrying
capacity. For Eurosolar, the villain is the fossil-nuclear complex,
whose centralised energy system has built us into a risky depen-
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dence on ﬁnite and environmentally harmful energy resources that
hreatens peace and prosperity. Hence, to Desertec the solution lies
n guiding mankind in a more secure direction, namely increased
eliance on controllable renewables, generated at home and in the
esert. Eurosolar, in contrast, sees that we – the citizens, including
ur directmunicipal representatives –must rid society of the fossil-
uclear complex, as its powerful actors would otherwise sabotage
he already ongoing transition to a sustainable future. Renewables
re highly suited for this, as they are both decentralised and envi-
onmentally friendly.
Desertec sees itself as blocked by a lack of political will to
mplement the Desertec concept: it could be done today, if only
oliticians understood the need and the beneﬁts and adjusted the
olicy framework to accommodate controllable CSP imports via
oint-to-point HVDC lines. Eurosolar instead sees the resistance
f the powerful fossil-nuclear complex as the main barrier, as its
ery existence is threatened by decentralisation. A striking differ-
nce is that theDesertec transition is something that shouldhappen
n the future (and likely will happen, once politicians understand),
hereas the Eurosolar decentralised energy transition is already
appening and simply needs to be continued and accelerated (and
rass-root movements will continue to carry out the transition,
nless politicians listen to the fossil-nuclear lobby).
. Discussion
.1. What is the disagreement between Eurosolar and Desertec
bout?
The comparison of the two organisations’ storylines show that
hey, behind the headline rhetoric of 100% renewables, strive to
chieve very different renewable electricity futures in very dif-
erent ways. Eurosolar emphasises democratisation and autonomy
hrough decentralisation as the prime aim, and renewables – being
f a small-scale and modular nature – are excellently suited for
his. Furthermore, Eurosolar views decentralisation as a necessary
recondition for decarbonisation: climate-friendliness cannot be
chieved if the fossil-nuclear complex, which caused the prob-
em in the ﬁrst place, is still powerful. To Eurosolar, the economic
ttractiveness originates in local value creation and the removal of
reedy energy majors. Desertec, in contrast, sees secure decarboni-
ation as the main goal and concerted policy action and large-scale
nvestment as the means to achieve it. Imports of controllable CSP
hrough longHVDCpower lines are the key to balancing thedomes-
ic European wind and solar PV generation. This trade also leads to
conomic, political and security beneﬁts of integrating Europe and
he Arab world. To Desertec, economic attractiveness comes from
uperior solar resources in the desert and the cheap system balanc-
ng with controllable imported solar power. The two organisations’
isions are thus only superﬁcially similar given their concern for
00% renewables: their envisioned end-state aims and governance
hoices, including the actors to carry out the change, are in fact
undamentally different.
.2. Is a compromise possible or are the two visions mutually
xclusive?
Comparing theseﬁndings to the theoretical visionclassiﬁcations
n literature (Section 2), it becomes clear that we have empir-
cally observed two visions following different normative aims
nd governance pathways, coherentwith the theoretical literature.
lthough the theoretical concepts are different, they explain the
ame vision divide, for largely the same reasons. In Cultural Theory
erms, Desertec follows a Hierarchical rationality, relying on top-
own policy and controllable large-scale solutions with securityof the decarbonisation as a key constraint. Eurosolar, in contrast, is
Egalitarian, relyingonbottom-up initiatives and small-scale invest-
ment with equity as the key constraint. Viewing it through Foxon’s
Logics, Desertec follows aGovernment Logicwhereas Eurosolar fol-
lows a Civil Society Logic, for largely the same reasons as in the
CT classiﬁcation; in Lovins’ terms, Desertec is a Hard energy path,
although it is based on renewables, whereas Eurosolar is Soft.
Both coalitions seek a completely renewable electricity system,
but in very different ways, for diverging reasons and with conﬂict-
ing governance paths. Desertec can, and claims to do, accept the
inclusion of decentralised renewables as a part of the future elec-
tricity system, as long as controllable solar power imports are the
securing pillar of supply. Expanding renewables in the Desertec
way, including large solar power stations and large and long power
lines, however violates the core aim of Eurosolar, which precludes
precisely such large assets and the companies owning them. As
it is hardly possible to import CSP from deserts to Europe in a
decentralised way, it is difﬁcult to imagine a compromise that
includes controllable CSP imports and is still acceptable to Euroso-
lar. To Eurosolar, the suggested consensus between Desertec’s and
Eurosolar’s 100% renewables aim is an illusion that is “perfectly
designed to maintain the old energy world order, albeit it with
renewables”xxxii [106]. This is consistent with Lovins’ statement
that “it is important to recognize that the two paths [Hard and Soft]
are mutually exclusive” [45].
This indicates that the idea of Battaglini et al. [40] to solve
the centralised-decentralised controvery by merging them into a
SuperSmart Grid vision is impractical: from a technical perspec-
tive, the two visions can co-exist, but politically the two visions are
irreconcilable as their end-state aims and desired actor and gov-
ernance structures clash. This is especially clear when comparing
the core aims: Eurosolar’s core aim of decentralisation precludes
the incorporation of centralised aspects, but such assets are the
core of Desertec. Hence, a compromise would require one vision
to abstain from its core aim. Such a solution, however, is hardly a
true compromise – or a clumsy solution [59] – but rather one vision
becomingdominantand forcing theother togiveup itskey identity:
DesertecwithoutCSP importswouldnot “beDesertec”, andEuroso-
lar’s visionwouldbenothing if the decentralisation aim is removed.
Hence, and regardless ofwhether their secondary aims are compat-
ible or not, a real compromise will be difﬁcult, or impossible, as the
core aims of the two visions are irreconcilable.
5.3. Outlook
Our study shows that the roots of the investigated controversy
are differences in normative end-state aims and governance solu-
tions for achieving these aims, and not primarily in technology,
power mix pie-charts or costs. We have thus empirically shown
that energy vision divides such as those theoretically derived in the
literature indeed exist, and that actors use such different visions,
suggesting that differences in aims and governance pathways are
key drivers of the general energy policy debate. We have shown
that controversies similar to that between renewables and nuclear
power – controversies that can hardly be solved with more opti-
misation modelling, pie-charts and cost estimates – also exist, in
at least one case, between proponents of a fully renewable future,
because there are fundamentally different and mutually exclusive
visions for how a future renewable power system should look and
be governed.
The core of the Desertec-Eurosolar controversy is about cen-
tralisation or decentralisation, about governance and ownership,
and yet such issues are rarely explicated in energy policy debates.
Explicitly acknowledging differences in normative objectives
between different renewables pathways and seeking compromises
concerning soft issues beyond hard facts such as technology, costs
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Rr the “necessity” formore transmission, could thus reduce conﬂict
bout the energy transition.
Similarly, scientiﬁc electricity system models miss, or ignore,
ssues beyond the techno-economic realm. Yet, normative issues
bout which energy future we want are key drivers for support or
pposition to policies and projects—and hence greatly important
or costs and a scenario’s chances of realisation (see Ref. [107]).
e thus call for future researchers, in particular electricity system
odellers, to assess more than one type of system (e.g. including
ecentralised scenarios) and tomake their underlying vision trans-
arent: explicitly including the normative frames that guide the
esearchers’ search for a better future, including how the system
s governed, could make the modelling effort more rigorous and
olicy-relevant.
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